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HUGO LAFAYETTE BLACK AND JOHN
MARSHALL HARLAN: TWO FACES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WITH SOME
NOTES ON THE TE ACHING OF
THAYER'S S UBJECT
Bv 0. W. WoLLENSAK*

I.
It was a great surprise last semester when Supreme Court
Justices Hugo Black and John Marshall Harlan visited the
LSU Law Center for what turned out to be a heated dialogue
on color video tape. The program was hosted by LSU's media
mastermind, Professor Paul Baier,** who apparently has
given up suing hospitals, see Baier v. Woman's Hospital, 1 and
turned to producing television shows, his latest entitled
"Hugo Lafayette Black and John Marshall Harlan: Two Faces
of Constitutional Law."2
Professor Baier believes that constitutional law includes
•

Editor's note:

Professor Baier is following Karl Llewellyn in using a pseudo

nym. Llewellyn's was "Teufelsdrockh," which means "devil's print" in German.

THE KARL LLE WELLYN PAPERS: A GumE TO THE COLLECTION
L. Twining eds.

1970).

93

See

(R. M. Ellinwood & W.

Llewellyn wrote as Teufelsdr0ckh whenever he wanted to toss

out a quasi-heretical piece. Professor Baier's

nom de plume

derives from 0. W.

Holmes, Jr., one of Baier's intellectual heroes, and from "Wollensak," the machine on
which he plays the recordings of the oral argument in Supreme Court cases in his
constitutional law classes. At the

1980

meeting of the Association of American Law

Schools in Phoenix, Professor Baier presented a demonstration of the

use

of these

recordings in teaching, and in speaking of the equipment necessary to play the tapes
in class, Mr. Baier picked up his trusty Wollensak

2520

and introduced it to the

crowd, saying: "This is my associate, Professor Wollensak, whose circle of constitu
tional acquaintances is wide indeed."
**Associate Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State Uni
versity. A.B., University of Cincinnati; J.D., Harvard. Member of the Louisiana Bar
and the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States. Judicial Fellow, United
States Supreme Court,

1975-1976.

Producer of

Court Reports,

a National Archives

film history of the Supreme Court of the United States.

1.

A case that, unfortunately for Mrs. Baier, neatly coupled the miracle of

childbirth with the knotty medico-legal question of husband access to the delivery
room. For further details, see Appendix A, infra, note 1.
Because the annotations to this article constitute an extensive commentary on
the materials and methods of teaching constitutional Jaw, they are set forth sepa
rately as Appendix A, infra.

1
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men:
I suppose this is obvious, but our methods have not recognized
the fact. Ours is a govern ment of laws, we say proudly, not of

�

men. And so our students study hundreds of cases, case a ter
case, the very embodiment of constitutional law. Never mmd
the men who make it. I believe our ide als have gotten .m the
way of teaching truth: Ours is a government of laws and of
men.8

The Black-Harlan dialogue was Professor Baier's way of fo
cusing student attention on the persons who make the law. "I
have always believed that if you can get a judge's philosophy
out in the open, you can better understand his cases," he s ays.

II.
Baier got the idea for his Black-Harlan dialogue while
watching Steve Allen's "Meeting of Minds," A PBS television
program that allows the viewer to see and hear noted histori

cal figures talking about their lives and sharing ideas. Anyone
who has seen this program knows it teaches history in a very
lively fashion; it also tends to improve the minds of the listen
ers-in. Doubtless, Henry Adams, whose job it was to teach his
tory at Harvard College back in 1870, would have welcomed
these illuminating conversations to his classroom.• But TV
was a technology unknown to man, and Steve Allen was not
yet sucking his thumb.
A few years ago Norman Redlich's ingenious "Black
Harlan Dialogue" appeared in print.5 The article, which Pro
fessor Redlich openly acknowledged as an unconventional
form of legal scholarship,8 is really the script for a short play
featuring Justices Black and Harlan, who are engrossed in a
meeting of minds of their own. Scene I depicts a country lane
in Heaven in late Spring 1975. The Justices are out for their
daily "constitutional," as it were. Each has a marked-up copy
of the Constitution which he managed to take with him on the
l ong j ou rney in 1971. As they stroll along, Black and Harlan
talk about life and law-argue would be a
better
word-through three engaging scenes, with Professor Redlich
adding a few citations in the notes for the reader's guidance.
One excerpt from Professor Redlich's article7 is enough to
demonstrate �ot only is it refreshing reading, but, more im
.
portant here, it is also powerful teaching.
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BLACK: You may think I twisted history to try to get the
Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment, but at least m y
view roots the Court's authority over the states in specific con
stitutional provisions. Under your theory each case would be
decided according to the concept of fundamental fairness
shared by a majority of Justices. It would all depend on what
would shock a particular judge's conscience.
HARLAN: I don't think that's fair, Hugo. Ever since Adam
son, you have constantly poked fun at those of us who believed
that due process involves a careful process of inclusion and ex
clusion. We were no less dedicated to basic human rights than
you were. We simply did not believe that the Bill of Rights,
word for word, is what the due process clause is all about.
Where the Constitution says that life, liberty and property
cannot be taken without due process of law, it calls upon us to
interpret that language in terms of evolving principles of
American justice.
BLACK: I never doubted your sincerity, John. It's just that
those words don't mean anything to me-even when I hear
them up here. And that's why your system, which I'm afraid is
prevailing, gives so much power to the courts. Depending on
their own whims or shifting political pressures, judges will now
be able to expand or contract individual rights.
HARLAN: Hugo, I rather doubt that my views have pre
vailed. However, even under your approach, judges have to
make the individual value judgments you attribute to my sys
tem. I'm sure you thought that if the first section of the four
teenth amendment could be read as incorporating the entire
Bill of Rights, judges would have to decide cases involving in
dividual rights and liberties within the context of specific con
stitutional provisions and not on the basis of personal judg
ments. However, as I said in Griswold, personal judgments are
involved in all important constitutional questions, whether
they concern a specific provision of the Bill of Rights or the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. As long as
America is a changing society, there is simply no way our con
stitutional system can be frozen into the kind of rigid pattern
you were trying to develop in the '50's and '60's. Consequently,
your system wouldn't protect individual liberty any more than
mine.
BLACK: I can't guarantee that it would. But my system gives
to the American people the rights that are set forth in the Con
stitution rather than the rights that a majority of judges think
they should have at any particular moment of history. And I

3
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have more faith in the text of the Constitution than in the
changing values of a majority of judges.

III.
Reading Norman Redlich's Black-Harlan Dialogue co� 
vinced Mr. Baier to m ake a production o f his own, only this
time he proposed lifting the Justices off the printed page and
having them come to class "live and in person," so to spe� k,
for his students to see and hear. "A casebook," says Baier,
"can be a dull thing and the case method of instruction
lifeless. "8
Only the other day law teachers were challenged anew to
do something, and not just to complain, about student bore
dom in the second and third years of law school.8 The words
are those of Derek Bok, seventh Dean of the Harvard Law
School, now President of Harvard University:
The great weakness of legal education is that Langdell's vision
is the only substantial insight we have ever had. As a result,
the law school experience tends to grow repetitive, and interest
declines steadily throughout the last two years . . . . If we try
seriously to do something about student apathy in the s e cond
and third years [we should] offer a wider variety of teaching
methods.10

Why not try the magic of television production?11"[N]o teach
ing is good," said James Bradley Thayer, "which does not
rouse and 'dephlegmatize' the students-to borrow an expres
sion attributable to Novalis-which does not engage as its al
lies, their awakened, sympathetic, and cooperating facul
ties."12 Thayer's Cases on Constitutional Law, which w as
published in 1895, is the grandfather of today's teaching
materials in constitutional law. Looking at the surviving
grandchildren you can see Thayer's influence. Without ques
tion, James Bradley Thayer was a giant scholar. But scholar
ship is not teaching and, like the rest of us, even Thayer had
his ups and downs in class.13 One wonders what Thayer would
think of this thoroughly modern notion of video-taping two
students portraying Justices Black and Harlan after a period

�

of ntense i� struction on their philosophies and opinions? To
Baie!, the idea seemed to have pedagogical promise.14 After
all, m the words of one of Thayer's teaching colleagues at
Harvard: "No man ever learned to dance or to swim by read-
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ing treatises upon saltation or natation."H Why not try put
ting our students in the justices' place?18
And so for three
weeks Baier w orked with two students in his Constitutional
Law II course, a second-year, individual rights offering. Ray
mond Maher, who has an Alabama accent of sorts, volun
teered to play the role of Hugo Black. Miles Tilly, who, be
lieve it or not, actually looks like John Marshall Harlan II
(especially after an hour's make-up session at the Drama
School on campus) was chosen to portray Justice Harlan. The
group met frequently at "The Library,"11 where Baier loos
ened up his two stars with a soothing libation. Miles had
never before done anything like this. Ray, on the other hand,
was a regular ham and he had no trouble with the assignment.
The three of them read all the biography on Black and Harlan
they could find, 18 and they read many of their opinions. 19
Finally the big day came, and 60 minutes of color video
tape was filmed at LSU's Instructional Resource Center. The
group worked without a script, and so the event was a kind of
oral examination for the students. By the time the tape was
made, Ray and Miles saw things pretty much the way their
judicial counterparts did, which is quite evident from the
video tape itself. After the filming, the tape was edited to 35
minutes, thus allowing 25 minutes for questions and discus
sion between the students and the two justices after the tape
was shown in class.20
It was interesting to observe the reaction of the students
to the tape. After a minute or two of expected snickering
("Hey, look at the make-up job they did on Ray"), the class
settled down and began listening attentively to what was be
ing said. In a very real sense, Justices Black and Harlan had
come alive in the classroom.
IV.
The transcript of "Hugo Lafayette Black and John Mar
shall Harlan: Two Faces of Constitutional Law," as well as the
video tape itself, is available from Professor Baier, and so the
full interview need not be set out here. A brief sampling will
suffice to allow the reader to evaluate the learning21 captured
on the tape.
BAIER:

Justice Black, you are the Senior Associate Justice. I

suppose I should ask you the first question.

6
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Yes sir.
Can you tell us what is your judicial philosophy? If I

ask you that question, what would you say about your judicial

philosophy?
BLACK:

My judicial philosophy is basically constitutional

ism. I interpret the Constitution as it is written, and I believe
that this is the way the Founding Fathers intended the institu
tion of the Supreme Court to be.
BAIER:
Black?

How do you interpret the Constitution, Mr. Justice

BLACK:

By what is written, a literal interpretation,11 and I

believe that this is the way the Founding Fathers intended the
institution of the Supreme Court to be.
BAIER:

Mr. Justice Harlan, how would you describe your ju

dicial philosophy?

Well, my philosophy is one essentially of self-re

HARLAN:

straint on the part of the judge. I don't believe that judges

should make law, simply that they should interpret what the
law says, and in interpreting the Constitution I don't believe it

was made to be interpreted literally. As Mr. Chief Justice Mar
shall once said, "We must always remember that it is a Consti
tution we are expounding. "28
BAIER:

Mr . Justice Black, your Brother Harlan said that you

are not supposed to interpret the Constitution literally.
BLACK:
BAIER:

He's wrong.
(laughing) He's wrong-well have you ever, on par

ticular cases, reached opposite results because you are of the
view that the Constitution ought to be interpreted literally and
he apparently is not?

BLACK: Yes, many times. Griswold v. Connecticut•• is a
classic example of what you just said. I do not believe that the

Constitution had anything in it that covered that particular
case, but my Brother John believed the opposite and made law,
which a judge-I feel a judge should not do.
BAIER:
v.

Justice Harlan, what was your position in Griswold

Connecticut?

HARLAN:

Well, first of all, I don't think we made law in that

case. My position in Griswold

u.

Connecticut was that the Due

Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment stands on its own
bottom. I don't believe we are limited by the words of the Con-

9
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stitution. When the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth
amendment says "nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," I inter
pret "liberty" as meaning those fundamental values without
which our basic social and political institutions cannot survive.
BAIER:

And one of those fundamental values was what in

Griswold

v.

HARLAN:

Connecticut?
The privacy of the marital relationship. I do not

believe that the state has the right to use the full sanction of
the criminal law to invade the privacy of married couples.
BAIER:
in

Mr. Justice Black, as you mentioned, you dissented

Griswold

BLACK:
BAIER:

v.

Connecticut.

Yes sir.
What is your own view about a state that would pro

hibit a married couple from using a contraceptive?
BLACK: Well, as I said in my opinion, I personally thought
the law was ridiculous, but a judge does not make law. A legis
lature makes law, and I feel that a judge's function is to inter
pret legislative law and not to make it. The people elect a sov
ereign body of legislators to make law, not judges.111
BAIER:

So you have a fundamental difference of opinion

with respect to the judge's function that caused a difference of
vote in

Griswold

v.

Connecticut. Mr. Justice Black, can you

give us a second illustration of how judicial philosophy led to
different results, in the case of Justice Harlan and yourself?
BLACK:

Well, going back to what my Brother Harlan said

about the fourteenth amendment, I feel he is wrong. It was a
particular point of dispute between me and his predecessor,
Felix Frankfurter. My opinion in

Adamson

v.

California .. in

1947 basically gives what I feel the Fourteenth Amendment
means; and I don't believe that a so-called judge's idea of lib
erty should be read into it.
BAIER: As I understand the Adamson case, an important
question was the nature of due process of law and how one de
termines what is and what is not according to due process of
law. And your view, Mr. Justice Black, is that you look to the
Bill of Rights?
BLACK:
BAIER:

Yes sir.
Now, as you probably know, at the time of your

Adamson opinion, a scho lar was quite critical and wrote a law

7
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review article, I believe it was Professor Charles Fairman.17
BLACK:
BAIER:

Yes.
I'm curious, did you read Fairman's critique of your

work?
BLACK: I read it,28 but I thought it was pure hogwash-to
use an Alabama term.
BAIER:

And you didn't agree with it?

BLACK: No, I think that my Appendix that I put to the
opinion clearly gives the reason why I said what I did, and it's
historically sound and cannot be disputed.
BAIER: Justice Harlan, has your colleague Justice Black per
suaded you that the Bill of Rights ought to be totally incorpo
rated and given meaning through the Due Process Clause?
HARLAN: I think that that notion does a grave injustice, or
will do great damage, to our basic governmental structure of
federalism, which is the basis of our structure. By incorporat
ing the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment, you are
putting a straight jacket on the states. I believe that the states
should be able to act however they want as long as they do not
violate fundamental fairness. My Brother Hugo's position is to
take the Bill of Rights and all of the federal jurisprudence that
has grown up around the Bill of Rights and to apply this to the
states. And I think this does violence to our basic notions of
federalism.
BAIER: Justice Black, you were a staunch supporter of Presi
dent Roosevelt's Courtpacking plan.
BLACK:

Yes sir, I was.

BAIER: Why? And can you describe the climate of the times
when you were �ominated for the Supreme Court?
BLACK: I basically felt that the Supreme Court justices on
the Court at that time were reading their own laissez-faire eco
nomic philosophies into the Constitution and basically sub
marining social and economic legislation that the people man
dated in the electoral process. I felt this wrong, and I felt that
it was leading the country on the road to disaster.19 I basically
agreed with Franklin-President Roosevelt's Courtpacking
plan-on this basis.
BAIER: When you took your seat as a Supreme Court justice,
did you bring those views to bear on your work and can you
say that you were responsible for change? Is that what you

BLACK AND HARLAN
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would say about your 34 years on the Court?
BLACK:

I would say, possibly; but then, again, I wouldn't

read my economic philosophies into my opinions either. I feel
that this is what should be done and I feel that if there's one
legacy I left on the Court, it's been this basic tenet that the
economic philosophy of a local, state, or national government
should be given much deference in the Court.
BAIER:

Justice Harlan, may I ask you, in your service on the

Court, which justice had the greatest influence on you; which
justice did you feel closest to and why?30
HARLAN:

Felix, Felix Frankfurter, would definitely be the

one. Felix, like the other great justices such as Brandeis and
Holmes, had this philosophy of judicial self-restraint. Their
philosophy was developed from the teachings of a man by the
name of James Bradley Thayer,31 whose teachings I also am
fully in accord with. Felix and I disagreed on the merits of
some cases, but essentially we both had the same idea of judi
cial self-restraint. I would definitely say Felix was the greatest
influence on me and the one I admired the most.
BAIER:

What were his personal traits that you admired?

HARLAN: Well, Felix would not approach a case in a hurry.
"Hard cases made had law " was his view. 32 And that's the
thing that I think I learned the most from him that was helpful

to me-was to approach a judicial problem and to sit down and
reflect on it and not to hurry through a decision. 33 And that is
the quality I admired most in him.
BAIER:

I seem to remember that in your dissenting opinion

in The Pentagon Papers Case,34 you did emphasize the fact
that the Court was terribly rushed and you thought it highly
inappropriate to reach a judgment that quickly. Justice Black,
may I ask you the same question. Which Supreme Court jus
tice do you feel closest to and admire most and why?
BLACK:

Well, I'd say on the present Court I feel closest to

Bill Douglas. He basically shares my ideas of judicial indepen
dence and courage and I would say that, going back to my fa
vorite Supreme Court justice, I would think it would have to he
John's Grand-daddy Harlan because of his independence. I re
ally admired that.
BAIER: Mr. Justice Harlan, what would you consider to be
your most important case in your years on the Supreme Court?
HARLAN:

I think my most important case was Poe

v.

Ull-

10
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man.36 And there, in my dissent, I fully explained my view of
due process of law, and it seems that recently some of the jus
tices have adopted this view-for instance, Justice Powell in
the case of Moore u. East
opinion in Poe u. Ullman.
BAIER:

Cleueland38 extensively cited my

Did that make you feel good?

HARLAN:

Yes sir, it did.

BAIER: Do both of you read the advance sheets? I mean, you
have been off the Court and retired for a number of years now.
Mr. Justice Harlan, you must look at them because you knew
about Justice Powell's work.
HARLAN:
BAIER:
BLACK:
BAIER:
BLACK:
BAIER:
BLACK:
BAIER:

Yes sir.

Justice Black, how about you?
Yes, I do.
Do you still play tennis?
I do.
And read?
I do, definitely.
Do you see each other often and reminisce?

BLACK: We usually do, but a lot of times it ends in an argu
ment. (Laughter)
v.

Obviously, this Black-Harlan dialogue focuses student at
tention on the persons who make the law. 87 This approach by
no means ignores the cases. Certainly not. Baier and his stu
dents study the usual cases, but they are ordered differently.
Particular judges are the focus of attention, not doctrinal top
ics. Teaching constitutional law in this fashion in the second
year shifts the gears and changes the epistemological pace, so
to speak. Varying the pace, Baier believes, helps learning.
What did the students think of using television to teach
law?38 According to Ray Maher:
The end result is that we learned more law• than I feel we
would learn in the normal classroom situation. Also, we learned
this law in a relaxed atmosphere that, I feel, is more conducive
to learning than a rigid classroom atmosphere.40 I also read a
lot of outside, non-casebook reading (biographies,

etc.), more

BLACK AND HARLAN
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than one gets to read normally.
This gives one the ability to grasp the subject matter bet
ter. Also, working with people in other areas of campus life was
a refreshing expe rience. A law student sometimes does not re
alize just how isolated from the main campus he is. Finally, the
experience was a pleasant diversion from the monotony of law
school.41

Miles Tilly said:
I feel that the preparation for the dialogue was a valuable
learning experience. It gave me an insight into the workings of
the United States Supreme Court that I did not have before.
First, I had not realized the influence which individual
members of the Court could have on their fellow justices. How
ever, after studying the lives and influences of Mr. Justice
Harlan and Mr. Justice Black, I now realize that this can be an
important factor. Second, I had not realized the great degree to
which most justices believe in the c onstitutional limitations to
their power.42 However, I now see that this realization is pre
sent in the beliefs of the truly great justices. Finally, I do not
think that I had a proper understanding of the role of the Su
preme Court in the American system of government under the
Constitution. However, I think that my study of the system of
the philosophies of Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Black

ha s helped me

to obtain

a proper perspective on

the role of the

Supreme Court in our government. 43
In closing, let me say again that I did find the making of
this video-tape to be a valuable learning experience. From the
questions that were asked of me after the film was shown in
class, I think my classmates found it to be such too.

VI.
Almost a century ago, at the time when "Mr. Langdell's
method ""4 was king, a consummate law teacher, Harvard's
John Chipman Gray,45 took it upon himself to assay the then
current state of the law teaching art in an article whose title
mirrored the prevalent technology of his time, "Cases and
Treatises. "46 How ironic, in light of what Gray said so long
ago, that legal education has seen nothing really new in over
100 years:
I am far from thinking that the method of case study as
practiced at Cambridge is the final word on legal education.
The improvement in the art of education during the last quar
ter of a century has been great. I do not believe that improve-

12
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ment has come to an end. 41

Perhaps it is time for a bit of the necromancer's art48 and a
Pedagogy of Persons49 in our law schools.
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APPENDIX A
SOME NOTES ON THE TEACH IN G OF THAYER'S SUBJECT
1.

Baier v. Woman's Hospital, 340 So.2d 360 (La. App.

1st Cir. 1976), writ refused 342 So.2d 224 (La. 1977), is one of
three reported opinions on the matter of husbands in the de
livery room, an issue that first took Professor Baier to Helena,
Montana, of all places, as Amicus Curiae for the International
Childbirth Education Association [Cf. Griswold, Teaching
Alone Is Not Enough, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 251 (1973)) to argue
the constitutional cause for Robert Hulit, M.D., an otherwise
gentle
obstetrician who
sued
his colleagues-imagine
that-over the claimed right of married couples to share the
coming of their children together in the delivery room. Dr.
Hulit's patients were trained in the LaMaze method of obstet
rics, which requires the husband's presence and assistance at
both labor and during delivery. Dr. Hulit won at trial, but lost
on appeal, with the Montana Supreme Court saying nothing
at all about the constitutional issues that Professor Baier had
briefed and argued as a "friend" of the court. See Hulit v. St.
Vincent's Hospital, 164 Mont. 168, 520 P.2d 99 (1973). So it
goes sometimes.
Well, it was back to Baton Rouge for the Baiers and into
court. This time, as parties plaintiff, Mr. and Mrs. Baier lost
both at trial and on appeal, with one child coming into the
world and another being conceived-so as to avoid mootness,
some would say-during the long course of the legal proceed
ings. The fact that at least 11 husbands had already been
brought into the delivery room at Woman's Hospital without
incident, and by the very same doctors who insisted at trial
that Paul Baier be kept out, meant nothing to the judges. But
see Brandeis, J., dissenting in Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590,
600 (1917): "Whether a measure relating to the public welfare
is arbitrary or unreasonable, whether it has no substantial re
lation to the end proposed is obviously not to be determined
by assumption or by a priori reasoning. The judgment should
be based upon a consideration of relevant facts, actual or pos
sible-Ex facto jus oritur. That ancient rule must prevail in
order that we may have a system of living law."
It should be noted, by way of bringing this story full cir
cle, that Woman's Hospital reversed itself a year and a half
later and started allowing trained and willing husbands into

14
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the inner sanctum. See Baton Rouge State Times, Aug. 11,
1978, at 1-B, col. 1. "Vindicated in the Court of Experience,"
says Professor Baier.
For commentary from the academic chair on the matter
of a man and woman sharing childbirth, see L. TRIBE, AMERI
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LA W § 1510 [Governmental Control over
the Body: Decisions About Birth] at 934 (1978), where Profes
sor Tribe expounds upon Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hos
pital, 523 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1975), a case that split the Sev
enth Circuit of Appeals (Stevens/Sprecher, JJ.) over this
unsettling riddle of law and life.
What did all of this teach Professor Baier? Many things,
to be sure. For one thing, he now appreciates more than ever

what Learned Hand had to say about litigation [quoted in J.
FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 40 (1949)]: "I must say that, as a
litigant, I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else
short of sickness and death." Also, he learned firsthand that:
"It is one thing to utter a happy phrase from a protected
cloister; another to think under fire-to think for action upon
which great interests depend." O.W. HOLMES, George Otis
Shattuck (1897), in THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OL

IVER WENDELL HOLMES 92, 95 (M.D. Howe ed. 1962) [hereinaf
ter OCCASIONAL SPEECHES ] .
2.

Earlier productions include " 'Double Revolving Peri

patetic Nitpicker': A Report on the Reporter," WLSU TV,
1978, an interview with Mr. Henry Putzel, jr., Thirteenth Re
porter of Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States. The transcript of this interview, with notes and an Ap
pendix on The True Story of the Ohio Syllabus Rule, has
been published in Y.B. 1980 SuP. CT. H1sT. Soc'v 10. Another
in this illuminating series of video tapes is an interview with
Frederick Bernays Wiener, LL.B Harvard, 1930, entitled "Ex
periences in Advocacy," WLSU TV, 1979. Colonel Wiener is
the author of BRIEFING AND ARGUING FEDERAL APPEALS (1967)
and a former Assistant to the Solicitor General and later As
sistant to the Attorney General of the United States. Mr.
Wiener argued a total of 38 cases at the Bar of the Supreme
Court of the United States, including his ultimate triumph in
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (on rehearing), the only in
stance on record of the Supreme Court of the United States
reversing itself, without a controlling change in membership,
following a published opinion. Professor Baier shows "Exper-
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iences in Advocacy" in his appellate practice seminar at LSU;
the tape allows students to see and hear real cases being ar
gued by a lawyer of extraordinary capacity-"one whose argu
ments are much esteemed by every member of this Court."
Felix Frankfurter to his "Dear Brethen," May 27, 1953,
Frankfurter Papers, Library of Congress, Box 219, File
004032. Another historic figure in this series is Erwin N. Gris
wold, who was sixth in Langdell's line as Dean of the Harvard
Law School and later Solicitor General of the United States
from 1967 to 1973. Dean Griswold's career as Solicitor General
spans 2 5 volumes of the United States Reports, 389 U.S. to
413 U.S., and his recorded television recollections are entitled
"A Life Lived Greatly in the Law," WLSU TV, 1980. Dean
Griswold's tape is a lively addition to the ink of the casebook
when Baier's constitutional law students reach The Pent agon
Papers Case, [New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971)], which General Griswold argued for the United
States. Copies of these video tape cassettes are available from
Professor Baier, C/O LSU Law Center, Baton Rouge, Louisi
ana 70803. If your interest centers on 0. W. Holmes rather
than on Colonel Wiener, Professor Baier also has Justice
Holmes, bona-fide, preserved on standard audio-cassette tape
and on 16 mm film.
3. P. Baier, Address before the National Archives Con
ference on Law in American Hist ory: New Historical Per
spectives and Resources 2-3, Washington, D. C. (Sept. 21,

1978) (copy on file at National Archives). Compare what Pro
fessor Felix Frankfurter used to tell his students at the
Harvard Law School:
We speak of the Court as though it were an abstraction.
To be sure, the Court is an institution, but individuals, with all
their diversities of endowment, experience, and outlook, deter
mine its actions .... In law, also, men make a difference.

F. FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME
COURT 8, 9 (1938).
Mr. Justice William Rehnquist also emphasized the im
portant place of the person in understanding the work of the
Supreme Court in his 1983 Edward Douglass White Lectures
at LSU, Lions Under The Throne. In introducing his lectures,
Justice Rehnquist quoted Ralph Waldo Emerson's comment:
"There is properly no history, only biography." Emerson's ap-
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proach, said Justice Rehnquist, "would indicate that some at
tention be paid to the individuals who have been judges of the
Supreme Court. " Justice Rehnquist went on to sketch the
lives and times of ten Chief Justices, including Edward
Douglass White, "to try to get some understanding of what
Chief Justices are like . . . [and] better our understanding of
the institution to some degree. " W. REHNQUIST, LIONS UN DER
(The Edward Douglass Lectures on Citi
THE THRONE
zenship, Forty-first Series, 1983, publication pending).
And listen, in this connection, to the arresting voice of
Justice Hugo Black, happily captured on the sound track of
"Justice Black and the Bill of Rights " (CBS News 1 968), the
first television interview ever with a sitting member of the
Court:
__

Our system of government puts different people on the
Court, people with different views. I think it's their business to
try to read these words-silly as it may sound to some people.
Some people have said that I'm either a knave or a fool be
cause, if I was not dishonest, I couldn't say there are absolutes.
Well, I just don't agree with them. I think I can and do.

Instead of listening to the professor talk, today's law stu
dent can see and hear Justice Black himself conducting a class
in constitutional law via the CBS film, which was shot on lo
cation in Justice Black's Alexandria, Virginia, home. No one
sleeps. No mind wanders. Hugo Black's visit to class is a pow
erful stimulus to thought and to discussion of fundamental
questions in constitutional law. "Speaking as a teacher, " says
Professor Baier, "I am glad to have Hugo Black come to
class. " Baier, Introduction to Hugo Black: A Memorial Por
trait, Y.B. 1982 SuP. CT. HIST. Soc'y 72, 73. This Memorial
Portrait is an account of the making of the 1968 CBS inter
view with Justice Black, written by his wife of fourteen years,
Mrs. Elizabeth S. Black. Professor Baier is the editor of HUGO
LAFAYETTE BLACK: THE MAGNIFICENT REBEL: A Personal
Memoir, by Hugo Lafayette Black & Elizabeth Seay Black,
forthcoming. A color film of the CBS interview, 32 minutes in
length, can be rented from University of Illinois Film Center,
1325 South Oak St., Champaign, Illinois 61820. Fortunately,
for those who consider it beneath their dignity to watch tele
vision (cf. Charles W. Elliot, Langdell and the Law School, 33
HARV L. REV. 518, 522 (1920) ("To Professor Langdell books
.
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had a kind of sacrosant character.")], a transcript of the
Agronsky-Sevareid interview, as it was shown on television,
has been published in a symposium issue of the Southwestern
University Law Journal honoring Justice Black, 9 S.W.U.L.J.
845 (1977). An unabridged transcription .of the interview,
which actually ran well over two hours, will be published in
the forthcoming Black Memoir.
4. We know from Adams's own account that he consid
ered the seven years he spent in teaching a failure. Why is
that? Because, as Adams tells of himself, "He could not get it
done to please him, rightly or wrongly, for he never could sat
isfy himself what to do . . ..Try as hard as he might, the
professor could not make it actual." H.ADAMS, THE EDUCA
TION OF HENRY ADAMS 300, 303 (1931).
5. Redlich, A Black Harlan Dialogue on Due Process
and Equal Protection: Overheard in Heaven and Dedicated
to Robert B. McKay, 50 N.Y.U.L. REV.20 (1975) [hereinafter

Redlich].
6. "What follows, therefore, in an unconventional form
of legal scholarship dedicated to a person whose instinct is to
eschew the commonplace, and whose vigor and openness en
couraged us to develop our talents to the fullest.:" Id. This
genre of writing seems to be catching on.For the latest contri
bution to the field see Strickgold, Nineteen Eighty: Being an
Interview with William 0. Douglas Shortly after his Death
Together with a Brief Remembrance of his Life, 10 GOLDEN

GATE U.L. REV. 535 (1980).
7. Redlich, supra note 5, at 23-24 (citations omitted).
8. AssocIATION OF AMERICAN LAw ScuooLs 1980 ANNUAL
MEETING PROGRAM, Sections on Constitutional Law and
Teaching Methods, 19.Trying to teach law students, as op
posed merely to professing at them, is no light assignment, as
anyone who has ventured into the crucible of the classroom
surely knows. And, for reasons best explained by Harvard's
John Chipman Gray, one gets nowhere trying to teach by
means of a text book:
I think a professor sometimes fails to realize how very dull
a text book is to students. He himself knows a good deal about
the subject, the leading authorities are familiar to him, he is
aware of the difficult and doubtful points, he probably has had
a case involving them in practice, very likely he has lost his
case [how true,

see

Baier

v.

Women's Hospital, 340 So.2d 360
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(La. App. 1st Cir. 1976), discussed supra note 1), and perhaps
his temper too [not in public: "It is a fine legal tradition to go
to the tavern to cuss the judge when he decides against you,
though assuredly it is unprofessional to stay mad at him more
than 3 or 4 months." Frederick Bernays Wiener to Felix
Frankfurter, May 8, 1964, Frankfurter Papers, Library of Con
gress, Box 112, Folder 002338 (quoted by permission)]. It is all
very real to him, and so he takes up the text book, eager to see
what the author has to say; whether he agrees with it or not, it
is interesting. But to the students this background is wanting.
The professor thinks "what an admirable, exact and lucid
statement of these difficult and complicated topics, it is just
the book for students; they cannot help finding it delightful."
But the students, not having had any experience of the difficul
ties and complications, cannot appreciate the merits of the
book; they are not delighted with it at all. They find it hard to
keep awake over it.

Gray, Methods of Legal Education, Part IV, 1 YALE L.J. 159,
160 ( 1 892).
It might be thought that, with the invention of the case
method of instruction and by virtue of the modern casebook,
things have changed, and for the better. Not so at all. As early
as 1932, Professor Frankfurter wrote to his colleagues on the
Curriculum Committee at Harvard, saying: "At the end of the
second year men 'are sick' of reading cases merely as a
method of training or as a means of finding out what cases
hold, what the doctrines are." Felix Frankfurter to the Com
mittee on Curriculum, Harvard Law School, May 1 2, 1932
(Some Observations of Third Year Work), in II SURVEY OF
THE HARVARD LAW CURRICULUM 1934-34, at 254 (copy in
Frankfurter Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1 43). Fortu
nately, through Gerald Dunne's painstaking scholarship,
Frankfurter's memorandum was brought to the attention of
the editors of the Harvard Law Review, who had the good
sense to recognize its relevance after fifty years. See Dunne,
The Third Year Blahs: Professor Frankfurter after Fifty
Years, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1 237 ( 1981).
9. There is a rich literature of boredom in the law
schools. All of it is summarized in Professor Bergin's trench
ant comment: "To be mercifully brief, law school is unmerci
fully dull." Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man Divided
A gainst Himself, 54 VA. L . REV. 637 648 (1968).
Of course, Mr. Bergin's arrow is wide of the mark, but the
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problem of monotony in the law school is quite real. Most of
the relevant commentary is noted in David Robertson's Some
Suggestions on Student Boredom in English and A merican
Law Schools, 20 J. LEGAL Enuc. 278 (1968), and the commen

tary continues to the present hour. See, e.g., Carrington &
Conley, The A lienation of L a w Students, 75 M1cu. L. REv.
887 (1977). For an early analysis of the monotony problem,
quite bold for its time, see Karl Llewellyn's incisive essay On
the Problem of Teaching "Private Law," 54 HARV. L. REV.
775, 793 (1941) ("And muddling through gets boring for them,
and we wonder why the edge is off the boys in the second
year.It is off because we--as we made our instruction-books
have taken it off .. . .We make slight effort to get hold of
counsel's argument, and so to present the case as an exercise
in how a lawyer goes about his job, an exercise in dealing with
cases from in frant. How should the edge not be off the
boys?").
The problem of teaching "public law," including constitu
tional law, might seem less pressing to some. It did to Frank
furter, who believed that "public law courses gave one a sense
of reality, dealt with things that were alive here and now, that
really will matter tomorrow, and involved complicated facts
that were themselves intrinsically interesting." Felix Frank
furter to Committee on the Curriculum, Harvard Law School,
May 12, 1932, quoted in Dunne, The Third Year Blahs: Pro
fessor Frankfurter after Fifty years, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1237,
1239 (1981). To Frankfurter's astonishment "[T]his opinion
was severely challenged" [id.] by a group of third-year stu
dents and the preceding year's editor-in-chief of the Harvard
Law Review. "Frankfurter realized then that the third year
was 'largely a bore' for the 'great muck of the class' who failed
to make the Law Review hierarchy, since no attempt was
made to give them any 'stimulus or exhilaration or a feeling of
excitement about the law and their future share in it." J. SE
LIGMAN, THE HIGH CITADEL: THE INFLUENCE OF THE HARVARD
LAW SCHOOL 65 (1978).
10. Bok, A Challenge to Legal Education, 31 HARV. L.
Seu. BULL. 12, 13-14 (1979). Compare Calvin Woodard's com
ments in The Limits of Legal Realism: An Historical Per
spec tive, 54 VA. L. REV. 689, 727-28 (1968):
Langdell's first year is our first year; his method-briefing
cases, analyzing holdings, socratic probing-is our method. In
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other words, legal education remains in form a kind of Procrus
tean bed in which all learning for lawyers is forced to lie. I
think I know why Langdell and his colleagues made it so.
Frankly, I do not know why we do, unless it is pure inertia
. . . . [L] ike Maitland's forms of action, it still rules us from
the grave.

11. " Who could resist the inspiration of the magic by
which light and sound were corverted into some other essence,
instantaneously transported, and made permanent upon a
tiny celluloid strip?" L. HAND, To the Harvard A lumni Asso
ciation ( 1936), in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 1 1 1 , 1 13 (I. Dillard
ed. 3d 1960). Judge Hand was speaking of the great moving
picture factories at Hollywood. Today television is the me
dium of the masses, and its potential for use in law teaching
was suggested over a decade ago by Professor Charles Kelso,
now of the McGeorge School of Law:
The law schools simply must begin experimenting with the
use of television as a catalytic agent for discussion. In the past,
and perhaps up to the present time, law students were for the
most

part

print-oriented.

Increasingly,

however,

the

law

schools will have a generation of students who have worked
with programmed instruction and who will have learned from
educational television, as well as having spent countless hours
in front of television sets.
Law schools have to take their students as they come and
cannot totally remold their methods of learning. And, accord
ing to Professor McLuhan, television is a medium which in
duces a high degree of total involvement, much as if the viewer
were experiencing an extension of his tactile sense and not
merely his eyes and ears. Students who have grown up on such
fare will expect higher education much more to resemble a
"happening" than a lecture.

Kelso, Behavioral Psychology: Springboard for Imaginative
Legal Educators, 45 DEN. L. REV. 313, 334-35 (1968).
Of course, there are some acute problems to overcome in
using television production to teach law. First, there is noth
ing in Edward L. ("Bull") Warren's SPARTAN EDUCATION
( 1942), a book that aims, in Professor Warren's words (p. ix)
"to give helpful suggestions to younger men who seek to jus
tify their existence by becoming effective teachers of the law"
about using television to teach law. Hence one can expect a
few raised eyebrows en route to the television studio. More
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serious is the problem that James Elkins stresses is his radi
ant essay The Paradox of a Life in Law, 40 U. PITT. L. REV.
129, 150-51 ( 1 979):
There is little encouragement from administ rators or col
leagues to pursue innovative and creative teaching methods.
Even with encouragement, the lack of staff and financial sup
port make innovation difficult. The effect is to discourage inno
vation and change in law teaching . . . . Given such an envi
ronment, it

should come as

little surprise that only the

exceptional law professor confronts the apathy of "status quo
ism" to attempt innovative teaching ideas.

12. J. B.THAYER, Preface to I CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, WITH NOTES at vii ( 1 895).
13. "He found teaching very difficult at first, and there
were certain streets in Cambridge through which he after
wards hated to go because he had been used to walking there
disheartened in this early time." J. P. Hall, James Bradley
Thayer ( 1 909) , in TuE CENTENNIAL HISTORY Or THE HARVARD
LAW ScHooL 276, 280 ( 1 918). Dean Hall, author of Mr.
Thayer's life in Lewis's GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS series, de
scribed him this way:
It goes without saying that a man of Professor Thayer's
exact scholarship and breadth of view left his mark upon legal
education in America. In the p rofessor's chair he was painstak
ing, candid, never dogmatic, yet firm in his own carefully
formed opinions. His success with his students was not that of
the magnetic teacher whose very personality inspires enthusi
asm in the work. It lay in the admiration and respect of many
successive classes for his mastery of what he taught, for the
powe r and accuracy of his thinking, and for the modesty and
fineness of the man.

Hall, James Bradley Thayer, in VIII GREAT AMERICAN LAW
YERS 345 (W.D. Lewis ed. 1909).
14. [l]f we value creativity , . . . then we may wish to give
a trial of ways of facilitating learning which give more promise
of freeing the mind. If we value independence, if we are dis
tributed by the growing conformity of knowledge, of values, of
attitudes, which our present system induces, then we may wish
to set up conditions of learning which make for uniqueness, for
self-direction, and for self-initiated learning.

C. ROGERS, ON BECOMING A PERSON 292 (1961), quoted in Mc-
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Dowell, The Dilemma of a (Law) Teacher, 5 2 B.U.L. REV. 247
(1 972).
15.

John Chipman Gray, Cases and Trea t ises, 22 AM. L.

REV. 756, 763 (1888).

16. While still a professor at Harvard Law School in
1930, Felix Frankfurter said that " I have long felt that there
is only one truly good course on constitutional law-the dis
cussions at the Saturday (now Wednesday and Friday) confer
ences of the Supreme Court. But, alas, that course in constitu
tional law is a strictly confined seminar, open only to the nine
members of the Court." Frankfurter, Book Review, 16
A.B.A.J. 251 ( 1930) (reviewing C. E. HUGHES, THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ( 1 928). Not any more. In a
third-year seminar on the Supreme Court, nine of Professor
Baier's students reach the ultimate plateau of their legal edu
cation: they become justices of the United States Supreme
Court and hear a case currently pending argued by two other
members of the seminar, who use the actual briefs submitted
by the lawyers in the case. The student justices meet in con
ference, vote, and prepare written opinions. The idea is an old
one [see Braden, The Current Business of the Supreme
Court, 3 J. LEGAL Eouc. 333 ( 1 952) ) , although Professor Baier
adds a pedagogical twist of his own: he video tapes the confer
ences, thus assuring thorough preparation and participation
and allowing a later critique of the justices' performance. So
far, the record of the LSU Supreme Court is perfect: Moore v.
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (5-4 for Mrs. Moore; 6- 3
the same way in the seminar); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of
Maryland, 437 U.S. 1 1 7 ( 1978) (7-1 for Maryland; 5-3 the
same way in the seminar); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228
( 1979) (5 -4 for Shirley Davis; 7-2 in the seminar) ; Consoli
dated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 531 (1 980) (7 2 for Con. Ed; 7-2 in the seminar).
There is one ticklish administrative problem with such a
seminar, viz., who gets to be Chief Justice? Sometimes a stu
dent's physiognomy entitles him to be Chief, as in the case of
Chief Justice Danny Knowles, who, looking like Taft, "mar
shalled" his Court to hold against Exxon and six other big oil
companies in their dispute with the Maryland Legislature.
Later, when the seminar visited the Supreme Court in
Washington, the group met with Mr. Justice Powell for an
hour's conversation. At this stage of the proceedings, accord-
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ing to Chief Justice Knowles's written account of the trip, the
educational cup was overflowing: "In my opinion, the tour of
the Supreme C ourt which you gave us on Thursday added
more to my legal education than anything else I have exper
ienced in my life. Mr. Justice Powell would, by his position,
have been a thrill to meet had he not said a word. I can hon
estly' say that his comment to me, ' You sure look like a Chief
Justice,' will never be forgotten. Letter from Daniel E.
Knowles, III to Paul Baier, June 6, 1978, on file in Chancel
lor's office, Paul M. Hebert Law C enter, Louisiana State Uni
versity (quoted by permission).
Professor Baier is quite convinced that this particular
seminar model produces a high level of educational output in
the third year of law school, when most students are otherwise
quite asleep mentally.
17. A local pub whose name is not, nota bene, a tribute
to C. C. Langdell, who, back in the 1 880's, laid it down that
"the library is the proper workshop for professors and stu
dents alike . .
" RECORD OF THE COMMEMORATION, NOVEM
BER FIFTH To EIGHTH, 1886, ON THE Two HUNDRED AND FIF
.

.

TIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF HARVARD COLLEGE
98 (1887), quoted in A. SUTHERLAND, THE LAw AT HARVARD

175 (1967) . Nevertheless, Professor Baier and his two co-stars
assembled at this location thinking of themselves as sort of
twentieth century Langellians:
There were about a dozen of us who took our hash to
gether at a boarding house on Brighton Street, and of these
Langdell was the presiding genius. At table, nothing was talked
but shop. Cases were put and discussed, and I have sometimes
thought that from these table discussions Langdell got the
germ of the idea that he later developed into the case system of
instruction which has made his name famous both here and
abroad.

Charles Phelps to Charles Warren, 1908, quoted in C. WAR
REN, II HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 1 8 1 -82 ( 1908).
18.

E.g., J. FRANK, MR. JUSTICE BLACK: THE MAN AND
His OPINIONS (1949); W. MENDELSON, JUSTICES BLACK AND
FRANKFURTER: CONFLICT IN THE COURT (1961); H. BLACK, JR.,
MY FATHER: A REMEMBRANCE (1975); (G. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK
AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION ( 1977).
Of course, Justice Black's own extra-judicial utterances
were very useful, especially, in light of the task at hand, Ed-
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mond Cahn's Justice Black and First Amendment "Abso
lutes ": A Pu blic Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 549 ( 1 962). See
also H. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865 (1960)
(James Madison Lecture, New York University School of
Law); "Hugo Black and the Bill of Rights " (CBS News 1968);
H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH ( 1969) (Carpentier Lec
ture, Columbia University School of Law).
On Justice Harlan, the group consulted THE EVOLUTION
OF A JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY: SELECTED OPINIONS AND PAPERS OF
JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN (D. Shapiro ed. 1969); N.
Dorsen, John Marshall Harlan, in IV THE JUSTICES OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789- 1969: THEIR LIVES AND
MAJOR OPINIONS 2803 (L. Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1969); N.
Dorsen, The Second Mr. Justice Harlan: A Constitutional
Conservative, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 249 ( 1969); Wilkinson, Justice
John Harlan and the Values of Federalism, 57 VA. L. REV.
1 185 ( 197 1).
Two law review articles treated Justices Black and
Harlan in combination, and, as a result, were most enlighten
ing. Professor Redlich's Black-Harlan Dialogue has already
been mentioned. The other is Norman Dorsen's Mr. Justice
Black and Mr. Justice Harlan, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 649 (1 971).
19. Instead of marching through the cases in the usual
manner, viz. to the drum of doctrine, Professor Baier's stu
dents come at a portion of the cases through the eyes of par
ticular justices. In other words, Hugo Black and John Mar
shall Harlan have a place on the syllabus; they are a formal
part of the course.
20. Before the tape is shown in class, students are as
signed a collection of excerpts from the opinions of Justices
Black and Harlan, including: Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
( 1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 ( 1965); In re Winship,
397 U.S. 3518 (1970); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 ( 1 963) ;
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1 967) ; Boddie v. Con
necticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1977); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S.
203 ( 1 961); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 ( 1961 ) ; Baird v. State
Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 23 (1 97 1 ) ; New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 ( 197 1 ) . After the tape is shown ,
students are given a transcript of the interview for further
study and for review purposes.
21.

By significant learning, I mean learning which is m ore
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than an accumulation of facts. It is learning which makes a dif
fere nce in the individual's be havior, in the course of action he
choose s in the future, in his attitudes and in his personality. It
is a pervasive learning which is not just an accretion of knowl
edge, but which interpenetrates with every portion of his
existe nce.

C. ROGERS, ON BECOMING A PERSON 280 (1961), quoted in Mc
Dowell, The Dilemma of a (Law) Teacher, 5 B.U.L .REV. 247,
253 (1972).
22. Compare Hugo Black's own words, in his public in
terview with Professor Edmond Cahn:
So we have a written Constitution. What good is it? What
good is it if as some judges say, all it means is: " Government,
you can still do this unless it is so bad that it shocks the con·
science of the judges." It does not say that to me. We have
certain provisions in the Constitution which say "Thou shalt
not." They do not say, "You can do this unless it offends the
sense of decency of the English-speaking world." They do not
say that. They do not say, "you can go ahead and do thus un·
less it is offensive to the universal sense of decency." If they
did, they would say virtually nothing. There would be no defi
nite, binding place , no specific prohibition, if that were all it
said.

Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public
Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 549, 561 (1962).
23. The exact quotation, as John Marshall laid down in
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407 (1819), is a trifle
different: " [W]e must never forget," said the Great Chief Jus
tice (not "we m ust always remember"), "that it is a constitu
tion we are expounding," an a dmonition that Professor
Frankfurter considered "the single most important utterance
in the literature of constitutional law-most important be
cause most comprehensive and comprehending." F. FRANK
FURTER, John Marshall and the Judicial Function (1955), in
FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME CouRT 534 (P. Kurland
ed. 1970).
24. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
25. A basic principle of separation of powers that young
Hugo Black heard espoused by his teachers at the University
of Alabama School of Law back in 1906: "Working with
Walker's AMERICAN LAW and other textbooks, Judge Thoring
ton and Judge Sommerville helped my classmates and me to
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learn the principles of the law as it then existed. They taught
us, as I recall, that legislators not judges should make the
law." H. Black, Reminiscences, 18 Ala. L. REV. 3, 10 (1965).
And some sixty years later, when it was Justice Black's turn
to teach law students a thing or two, he repeated the same
fundamental point, putting it this way in his 1968 Carpentier
Lectures at Columbia University School of Law:
[T] here is a tendency now among some to look to the judi
ciary to make all the major policy decisions of our society
under the guise of determining constitutionality. The belief is
that the Supreme Court will reach a faster and more desirable
resolution of our problems than the legislative or executive
branches of the government. To the people who have such
faith in our nine justices, I say that I have known a different
court from the one today. What has occurred may occur again.
I would much prefer to put my faith in the people and their
elected representatives to choose the proper policies for our
government to follow, leaving to the courts questions of consti
tutional interpretation and enforcement.

H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 1 1 (1969).
26. 332 U.S. 46 (1947)
27. Fairmar, "Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incor
porate the Bill of Rights": The Original Understanding, 2
STAN L. REV. 5, 139 (1949): "In his contention that Section I
[of the Fourteenth Amendment] was intended and understood
to impose Amendments I to VIII upon the states, the record
of history is overwhelmingly against [Justice Black]."
28. "I have read and studied this article extensively, in
cluding the historical references, but am compelled to add
that in my view it has completely failed to refute the infer
ences and arguments that I suggested in my Adamson dis
sent." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 1 45, 165 (1965) (Black
J., concurring).
In his dissenting opinion in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
383 (1970), Justice Black again dismissed Fairman's article
out of hand, saying:
Mr. Justice Harlan continues to insist that uncontroverted
scholarly research shows that the Fourteenth Amendment did
not incorporate the Bill of Rights as limitations on the States

. . I cannot understand that conclusion. Mr. Fairman, in
the article repeatedly cited by Mr. Justice Harlan surveys the
legislative history and concludes that it is his opi ion that the
.

.

�
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amendment did not incorporate the Bill of Rights. Mr. Flack,
in at least an equally "scholarly" writing, surveys substantially
the same documents relied upon by Mr. Fairman and con
cludes that a prime objective of Congress in proposing the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was " [t ] o make the
Bill of Rights (the first eight Amendments) binding upon, or
applicable to, the States." . . . . It is, of course, significant that
since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment this Court
has held almost all the provisions of the Bill of Rights applica
ble to the States . . . . To me this history indicates that in the
end Mr. Flack's thesis has fared much better than Mr. Fair
man's "uncontroverted" scholarship .

397 U.S. at 383 n. 11 (citations omitted).
29. In a radio address delivered in 1937, Senator Black
attacked the Court's "judicial tinkering with the Constitu
tion" and he expressed his dismay "at the Supreme Court's
use of reasonableness through the Due Process Clause to par
alyze legislative action to cure pressing social and economic
problems." See H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 2 6 (1969).
Hearing this radio address would doubtless vivify Mr.Justice
S.
Black's opinion for the Court in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.
726 (1963), which all too often remains buried in the ink cas
ket of the casebook. Cf. 0. W. HOLMES, The Use of Law
Schools (1886), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES 34, 43 ("Does not a
man remember a concrete instance more vividly than . . .
when you merely see it lying dead before you on the printed
page?").
30. This question, if not the whole approach of Profes
sor Baier's "Pedagogy of Persons," see Part VI infra, is a re
sponse to Roger Cramton's call for a few professional para
digms in the classroom: " [T]he young professional hungers for
mature prof�ssionals on which he can model his conduct."
Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Class
room, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 247, 259 (1978). The idea, of course,
is hardly new to legal education. As far back as 1817, David
Hoffman, in his A CouRSE OF LEGAL STUDY ADDRESSED To
STUDENTS AND THE PROFESSIONAL GENERALLY, advised the law
student "to seek his lights chiefly in his own heart and under
standing, and from the numerous examples, for weal and for
wo, afforded him in the lives of others. " Id. at 635 (2d ed.
Baltimore 1836).
31. I am of the view that if I were to name one piece of
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writing on American Constitutional Law-a silly test maybe-I
would pick an essay by James Bradley Thayer in the Harvard
Law Review, consisting of 26 pages, published in October, 1893
(7 HARV. L. REV. 17], called 'The origin and Scope of the Amer
ican Doctrine of Constitutional Law' which he read at the Con
gress on Jurisprudence and Law Reform in Chicago on August
9, 1893. I would pick that essay written 62 years ago. Why
would I do that? Because from my point of view it's the great
est guide for judges and therefore, the great guide for under
standing by non-judges of what the place of the judiciary is in
relation to constitutional questions.

F. FRANKFURTER, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 299-300 (H.
Phillips ed. 1960).
For a nifty piece of detective work tracking the power of
Thayer's pen, see Wallace Mendelson's The Influence of
James Bradley Thayer Upon the Work of Holmes, Brandeis,
and Frankfurter, 3 1 VAND. L. REV. 71 ( 1978).
32. Following the wise admonition of Holmes, J., dis
senting the Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S.
197, 400-01 ( 1904):
Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are
called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping
the law of the future, but because of some accident of immedi
ate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and
distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a
kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was
clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled princi
ples of law will bend.

33. Rooting through the Frankfurter Papers at the Li
brary of Congress (with great care, of course) is an adventure
that Mr. Baier likes to share with his Supreme Court seminar
students, who accompany him to Washington, D.C., at the
conclusion of classes for a week of on-location learning. [Cf. C.
C. Langdell: "I wish to emphasize the fact that a teacher of
law should be a person who accompanies his pupils on a road
which is new to them, but with which he is well acquainted
from having often travelled it before." Speech at the Quarter
Millennial Celebration of Harvard University, at Cambridge,
Nov. 5, 1886, in Harvard Celebration Speeches, 3 L.Q. REV.

123, 124 (1887).] And on one of these annual forays into the
Frankfurter Papers the group turned up a 30-page, type -writ
ten nugget captioned Conversations Between L .D.B. and F.F.,
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which records what Justice Louis Dembitz Brandeis and Pro
fessor Felix Frankfurter had to say to one another about
Court business from 1921 to 1935. This illuminating document
is a diary of sorts, and, surprisingly, Joseph Lash makes no
mention of it in his eye-opening book FROM THE DIARIES OF
FELIX FRANKFURTER (1975). Doubtless Professor Frankfurter
made good use of the information he got from Justice Bran
deis in his teaching at Harvard, and the Conversations memo
is assigned reading in the second year of instruction in consti
tutional law in Mr. Baier's course at LSU. The memorandum
is new intellectual capital, unmasking decisionmaking in the
Supreme Court [Cf. J. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF
THE LAW ( 1976)], and exposing the roots of judgment in con
stitutional cases. And these Conversations conclude with a
grave admonition that bears repeating every so often: "The
work of a judge should never be done in a hurry." Conversa
tions Between L.D.B. and F.F. at 30, Frankfurter Papers, Li
brary of Congress, Box 224, Folder 00401.
Compare Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 485 ( 1956)
(Reservation of Frankfurter, J.):
Time is required not only for the primary task of analyz
ing in detail the materials on which the Court relies. It is
equally required for adequate reflection upon the meaning of
these materials and their bearing on the issues now before the
Court. Reflection is a slow process. Wisdom, like good wine,
requires maturing.
Moreover, the judgments of this Court are collective judg
ments. They are neither solo performances nor debates be
tween two sides, each of which has its mind quickly made up
and then closed. The judgments of this Court presuppose full
consideration and recons ideration by all of the reasoned views
of each. Without adequate study there cannot be adequate de
liberation and discussion. And without these, there cannot be
th at full interchange of minds which is indispensable to wise
decision and its persuas ive formulation.

34. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
752 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
35. 367 U.S. 497, 523 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
36. 431 U.S. 494, 501-02 ( 1977).
37. Mrs. Elizabeth S. Black, the Justice's wife for four
teen years and a woman who, in Holmes's expression "added
gold to the sunset," visited the LSU Law Center and saw the
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Black-Harlan television production for the first time in the
company of Ray Maher, who portrayed her husband i n the
show, and other students and faculty. Mrs. Black told the
group of the close personal relationship that existed between
Justices Black and Harlan despite their strong intellectual
differences on such matters as the meaning of due process and
the scope of the First Amendment. During her stay at LSU,
Mrs. Black added sparkle to Professor Baier's class by guest
lecturing on the Barnwell Brothers and Arizona Tra in Length
cases [ South C. Hwy. Dept. v. Barnwell Bros. , :m3 U.S. 177

(1938); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 76 1 ( 1 945) ) ,
telling the students how "Hugo really hated that word 'rea
sonableness. ' " Compare G. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE Ju
DICIAL REVOLUTION 188 (1977) (" [ l ] n South Carol ina Highway
Department v. Barnwell Brothers, Stone upheld a South Car
olina statute limiting the size of trucks-even those in inter
state travel-in an opinion from w hich he removed one small
but critically significant adverb at Black's behest. For after
the excision the challenged law was validated as 'adapted to
the exercise of an acknowledged legislative power,' and not as
one 'reasonably' adapted."). Needless to say, when asked,
"What one class made the greatest impression on you and
why?"-Question

17

on

the

Baier

Course

Evaluation

Form-most students cited Mrs. Black's visit. " Her appear
ance impressed upon me the fact that Supreme Court justices
are human," said one of the students. Another said " [t]he at
mosphere was so intense one got caught up in learning. "
Course Evaluations, Constitutional Law I, LSU Law Center,

Mr. Baier, Spring 1980, on file in Chancellor's Office, Paul M.
Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University.
Ray Maher and Miles Tilly
their experiences in writing, and the
are taken verbatim ac literatim from
Chancellor's Office, Paul M. Hebert
State University.

38.

were asked to critique
quotations that follow
their reports, on file in
Law Center , Louisiana

Of course, "learning the law" includes more than a
mere accumulation of facts. Real learning affects one's atti
tudes, one's thought patterns, the course of action one chooses

39.

in the future. Not surprisingly, after stepping up to the Su
preme Court of the United States in his third year of law
school (see note 16 supra), Mr. Justice Maher dissented when
the LSU Supreme Court decided Davis v. Passman in Ms. Da-
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vis's favor. Doubtless, Hugo Black would have done the same
thing, following his dissenting opinion in Bivens v. Six Un
known Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 427, 430 ( 1971)
("the bu s i ne ss of the judiciary is to interpret the laws and not
to make them").
40. On this atmospheric point, compare what Mr. Baier
had to say in his Address before the National Archives Con
ference on Law in American Society: New Historical Per
spectives and Resources, Wash., D.C., Sept. 21, 1978, supra
note 3, at 33 ("Learning that is fun is easy. Learning that is
tedious is empty. ") with Dean Francis Allen's views in his Mr.
Justice Holmes and "The Life of the Mind, " 52 B.U.L. REV.
229, 234 ( 1 972) [reprinted in F. ALLEN, INTELLECT AND EDUCA
TION 1 , 7 (1 979) ] ("One of the modern ideas most subversive
to ' th e life of the mind' is the notion the 'learning is fun.' It
would be closer to the mark to say that 'learning is pain.' ").
41. In 1959, James Casner and Benjamin Kaplan of
Harvard characterized "sameness of method through the three
years" as "a besetting sin of legal education" and deplored the
fact that "the image of the first year repeats itself later with
only a certain blurring of outline," without "enough step-up
or progression. " A. J. CASNER & B. KAPLAN, LAW SCHOOLS
LooK AHEAD 103 ( 1959), quoted in W. Gellhorn, The Second
and Third Years of Law Study, 17 J. LEGAL Eouc. 1, 5 (1964).
In 197 4 Professor Boyer and Dean Cramton repeated the
charge:
The sameness in course content and teaching methods
throughout the law school experience, together with the ab
sence of an orderly progression in the development of skills
and substantive knowledge, have p rob ably contributed to the
frequently-noted boredom and withdrawal
ond-and third-year law students.

of

some

sec

Boyer & Cramton, American Legal Education: An Agenda for
Research and Reform, 59 C ORNELL L. REV. 221, 230 ( 1974).

And Harvard's President Bok, a former law dean himself, has
said the same thing. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
Obviously, Ray Maher is in good company in mentioning
the monotony of law school. More important, he was a partici
pant in a concrete effort to do something, and not just to com
plain, about the monotony problem in legal education. Cf.
John Chipman Gray, Methods of Legal Education, Part IV, 1
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YALE L. J. 159, 161 (1892): "A Man who has much to say

about 'systems' is sailing perilously near the shoals of cant.
Not by their systems but by their fruits shall ye know them."
42.

An important lesson, to be sure, for students of con

stitutional law to learn and for teachers of the subject to
teach. Compare P. FREUND, A. SUTHERLAND, M.D. How E , & E.
BROWN, Preface to First Edition ( 1954), CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES AND OTHER PROBLEMS at xxvi (4th ed. 1977): "Above all,

the topical arrangement reflects a conviction that present- day
students (doubtless differing from their predecessors of a gen
eration ago) have greater need to be reminded that constitu
tional issues may yield to objective analysis and resolution
than to be reinforced in the impression that the subject is an
undisciplined expression of personalities."
43.

Compare Felix Frankfurter's comment, in his letter

to Fairman, that "The work of the Supreme Court is the his
tory of relatively few personalities . . . . To understand what
manner of men they were is crucial to an understanding of the
Court." Felix Frankfurter to Charles Fairman, Dec. 27, 1 948,
quoted in The Writing of Judicial Biography: A Symposium,
24 IND. L. J. 363, 367 ( 1949) .
44.

The

expression

"Mr.

Langdell's

method"

is

Holmes's, in his Oration on the Use of Law Schools and
Their Methods of Instruction, before the Harvard Law School
Association, at Cambridge, Nov.
SPEECHES 34, 43.

5,

1886,

in OccASIONAL

One wonders what 0. W. HOLMES would think of Mr.
Baier's method. Perhaps there is a clue in what Holmes had to
say at the unveiling of memorial tablets at Ipswich, in 1902:
I think it a noble and pious thing to do whatever we may
by written word and molded bronze and sculptured stone to
keep our memories, our reverence, and our love alive and to
hand them on to new generations all too ready to forget.

0. W. HOLMES, Ipswich, in OccASIONAL SPEECHES 16.
45.

Lecturer in Law, 1869, 1871 -73; Story Professor of

Law 1875-83; Royall P rofessor of Law 1883-1913. Thus Gray

was both the first and last of the great teachers who sur
rounded Langdell. After some forty years of teaching and
shortly befor� the end, Gray told Williston: " I cannot imagine
an! more delightful work than teaching intelligent young men
.
thmgs which you know and which they do not know but desire
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to know. " Quoted in Williston, Joh n Chipman Gray, 28 HARV.
L. REV. 544, 547 (1915). "His resplendent ties were the glory
of the School . " John Chipman Gray, in THE CENTENNIAL HIS
TORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, 1817- 1917, at 209 ( 1 918).
Much more important, in terms of identifying Gray as a great
teacher, is his farewell letter to the Class of 1913 in Property
III [reproduced in facsimile in THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY, op
posite 2 1 3 ) , which includes this telling line: "I have always felt

that on both sides it was not an attempt to show how much
we know, or how smart we were, but that we were fellow-stu
dents trying to get to the bottom of a difficult subject."
46.

22 AM. L. REV. 756 ( 1 888). From the article it ap
pears that Gray was decidedly on the side of cases, not trea
tises, in the Great War for Pedagogical Supremacy that raged
after Langdell published his CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
in 1871. For details of the fight, see J. REDLICH, THE COMMON
LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW
SCHOOLS (1914). Gray, following Holmes ["Why, look at it
simply in the light of human nature. Does not a man remem
ber a concrete instance more vividly than a general princi
ple?" The Use of Law Schools (1886), in OCCASIONAL
SPEECHES 34, 43) , favored the case method because: "The case
gives form and substance to legal doctrine, it arrests the at
tention, it calls forth the reasoning powers, it implants in the
memory the principles involved." Gray, Cases and Treatises,
22 AM. L. REV. at 764. To his everlasting credit, Gray was not
closed-minded o n the matter of teaching methods in the law
schools. Nor did he foreclose the p ossibility of improvements
in the future. "All I contend is that the method of study by
cases is the best form of the legal education that has yet been
discovered." Id. at 763.
47.

22 AM. L. REv. at 762-63.

48.

The expression " necromancer's art" is Learned
Hand's, in his Address to the Harvard Alumni Association
(1936) , in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 1 1 1, 113 (I. Dillard ed. 3d.
1960).
Quite recently, in his 1979 Isaac Ray Awards Lectures,
Some Psychological Forces in the Ebb and Flow of Profes
sional Status: Implications for Training and Regulation, de

livered at Boalt Hall, Berkeley, Professor Andrew Watson of
the University of Michigan called for the archiving, on video
tape, of the great lawyers and judges of our time. "Would it
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not be wonderful if we had some well conducted interviews
with Justices Holmes, Cardozo, Brandeis, and Frankfurter?
Would it not be exciting for law students to listen and watch
the judicial thought processes of the brothers Hand, or better
still, to see them work? " Watson, The Current Status of L�w

yer Professionals: Some Implica tions for Legal Education,
Isaac Ray Awards Lectures, Part Ill, in 24 LAW QUAD. NOTES
17,

24

(1980). No doubt, most students would welcome these

video tapes to class, and for reasons graphically recorded in
Scott Turow's diary of the first year at Harvard Law:
But students still see the operation of the law only in a second
hand and thirdhand way, as it is revealed in carefully prepared
case reports. Learning to think like a lawyer should involve
more than the mastery of an important but abstract mental
skill. Were I king of the universe-or dean of the Harvard Law
School-I would supplement case reading with use of other de
vices-film, drama, informal narrative, actual client contact
like that provided in the upper-year clinical courses-seeking
to cultivate a sensitivity to the immediate human context in
which the law so forcefully intervenes.

S. Tuaow , ONE-L

297-98 (1977).

Precisely.

Compare Frankfurter's teaching, as described by Er
win Griswold, who took F.F.'s Federal Jurisdiction seminar at
Harvard:

49.

It was an opportunity for Professor Frankfurter to roam;
and this he did, leading his students through many episodes of
the Supreme Court in history, and into problems in its struc
ture and place in our governmental system . . . . But beyond
this was a broad introduction not only to the Supreme Court as
an institution but also to many of its Justices as persons. Mar
shall, Story, Taney, Field, Bradley, Waite, Miller, Moody-all
?f these and others of the past came alive and took their places
m

the stream of thought which is the business of the Supreme

Court. And the contemporary Justices-Taft' Holmes Bran
�eis, Butler, Stone and the rest, became real pe sonali
.
ti�s-mtellectual personalities-with whom one might agree or
differ but for whom one acquired some measure of under
�
standing and respect.

�

Griswold, Felix Frankfurter- Teacher of the Law' 76 HARV.
L. REV. 7, 8-9 (1962).
And consider, in this connection, what Archibald Cox h ad
to say when he wrapped up his review (92 HARV. L. REv. 1 170,
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1 182-83) of Joel Seligman's THE HIGH CITADEL: THE INFLU
ENCE OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (1978):
In the end, young men and women do not set their com
passes solely-or even chiefly-by courses of formal instruction
. . . . Much used to be done by portraying great figures in An
glo-American Law: Coke, Erskine, Marshall, Story, Evarts, Ru
fus Choate, Clarence Darrow, Holmes and Brandeis. The list
goes on and on. Today one would add Robert H. Jackson,
Hugo Black, Earl Warren, Felix F rankfurter, Thurgood Mar
shall, and many others. I cannot speak for my colleagues, but I
have failed to present the examples that my classmates and I
admired as Austin Scott, Felix Frankfurter, and Edmund Mor
gan p resented them to us. The mood has seemed against it.
History and heroes seem to command little attention from the
"now" generation. I would like to have the opportunity back.

Those who follow the dry stuff of jurisprudence will rec
ognize the link between Baier's call for a Pedagogy of Persons
and John Noonan's 1972 Holmes Lecture at Harvard, which
focused on "the central place of the human person in any ac
count of the law." Yet, as Noonan observed:
Little or no attention is given to the persons in whose
minds and in whose interaction the rules have lived-to the
persons whose difficulties have o c casioned the articulation of
the rule, to the lawyers who have tried the case, to the judges
who have decided it. No key reporting system is keyed to coun
sel. No ency clopedia is arranged in terms of judges. The prime
teaching tools, the casebooks, have been composed to shed
light on the life of a rule, not upon the parts of the participants
in the process. Those in the classic mold, with snippets of ap
pellate opinions ar ranged to display variations and contradic
tions of a principle, carry the indi.fference to the participants to
the maximum.

J. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW viii, 6-7
(1976 ).
Professor Noonan was not speaking specifically about
constitutional law or its instruction in the law schools. But it
should be obvious that Baier's work involves an attempt to
apply a similar jurisprudence of persons to the challenge of
teaching Thayer's subject.

